Infisical's Agent Vault launch is a useful reminder, not a magic shield: agents like OpenClaw and Hermes should not need to hold raw API keys in their context, env, or readable config. A broker/proxy can keep the real credential outside the agent and attach it only on allowed outbound requests. If your current setup already exposed provider, GitHub, Stripe, database, or bot tokens to agents, treat the migration as a controlled auth-change: snapshot first, rotate carefully, and smoke-test before unattended work resumes.
In simple words: Make a safe copy if the step could change your setup, try the smallest check, then confirm OpenClaw is back to normal before doing more. The source link and commands stay below for people who want the technical detail.
Checklist
Inventory every real secret an agent can read today: env files, shell profiles, repo config, `.openclaw`, `.hermes`, CI variables, browser sessions, mounted workspaces, and logs.
Secret exposure inventory before changing auth
# Run from each repo or agent workspace you control. Keep results private.
find . -maxdepth 4 -type f \( -name '.env*' -o -name 'openclaw.json' -o -name '*auth*' -o -name '*token*' \) -print
# Then inspect which files are readable by agents before rotating anything.
Snapshot first with a verified backup or known-good rollback point before changing auth, proxy, provider, or gateway settings.
Safer migration order
1. Snapshot / backup.
2. Choose one service to broker.
3. Replace the agent-visible real key with a dummy or proxy token.
4. Allow only the target API host/path in the broker.
5. Run one small authenticated smoke test.
6. Rotate any previously exposed key and record the rollback note.
Move one high-value service first — provider API, GitHub, Stripe, database, or bot token — behind Agent Vault or an equivalent credential broker/least-privilege boundary.
Give the agent a dummy placeholder or short-lived proxy token, not the real secret; let the broker attach the real credential only for the approved host and endpoint.
Turn on strict egress/allowlist behavior where possible, then run one small authenticated smoke test through the agent path you actually use.
If a real key was already exposed to an agent, rotate it and confirm the old key no longer works before returning to unattended jobs.
Write down the rollback point, restore command, and smoke-test result before letting background agents use the new brokered path.
Success looks like
• Agents no longer need raw high-value API keys in their readable environment or prompt-accessible files.
• Each brokered service has a named host/endpoint policy instead of broad unrestricted egress.
• The credential change has a named rollback point, restore command, and smoke-test result before background agents resume.
• Rotated keys and proxy changes have a smoke-test result and rollback note before unattended work resumes.