SECURITY • OpenClaw quick fix
Featured: @techSage
Tailscale-exposed gateway? Do not leave `auth=none`.
A fresh OpenClaw field signal pointed at an upstream gateway hardening commit that rejects Tailscale-exposed gateways when auth is disabled. Treat that as a useful operator rule even before you depend on the guard: if a gateway is reachable from another device, teammate, tunnel, or shared network, `auth=none` is not a safe steady state. Snapshot first, switch to token/TLS-backed access, and smoke-test from the network path your agents actually use.
In simple words: Make a safe copy if the step could change your setup, try the smallest check, then confirm OpenClaw is back to normal before doing more. The source link and commands stay below for people who want the technical detail.
Checklist
Inventory every OpenClaw gateway bind address, tunnel, Tailscale hostname, reverse proxy, and shared host where another machine could reach the gateway.
Exposure review before changing auth
- Is the gateway bound only to localhost, or reachable on a Tailscale/shared-network address?
- Is any tunnel, reverse proxy, firewall rule, or container port publishing the gateway?
- Is auth explicitly token/TLS backed, or effectively disabled as `auth=none`?
- Which agent profile or CLI command must still work after auth is tightened?
If the gateway is reachable over Tailscale or any shared network, remove `auth=none` before resuming unattended agent work; do not count VPN membership as gateway authentication.
Create a verified backup or rollback note before changing gateway auth, tokens, TLS, service files, or remote-agent config.
Restart the gateway with your normal supervisor and confirm unauthorized requests fail while the intended CLI/agent profile still connects.
Smoke-test expectation
# After switching away from auth=none and restarting:
# 1. An unauthenticated request from the reachable network path should fail.
# 2. Your intended CLI/agent profile should pass its normal gateway/auth probe.
# 3. Keep the previous config/backup label until one real agent run succeeds.
Record the new auth mode, token-rotation owner, exposed hostname, and smoke-test result so the next update does not silently reopen the no-auth path.
Success looks like
• No Tailscale, tunnel, reverse-proxy, container-published, or shared-network gateway is running with `auth=none`.
• Unauthorized requests fail from the network path that used to reach the gateway, while the intended operator/agent path still works.
• The auth change has a dated rollback note and token owner instead of being a one-off config edit.
Source: GitHub commit + X field signal · link